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ACRONYMS & GLOSSARY 
 
AREU  Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit  
AISS      Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies  
HIA                 Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan  
MoHE     Afghanistan Ministry of Higher Education  
MoFA      Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
NED        National Endowment for Democracy  
ISAF      International Security Assistance Force  
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NDS     National Directorate of Security 
 
Imam – is a person entrusted in an Islamic leadership role to both lead prayers in a mosque as 
well as to participate as a community leader or to give guidance to community leaders. 
Madrasa – derived from Arabic, is the term for educational institutions.  However, more recent 
usage associates the term with Islamic religious school. 
Shariat – is Islamic canonical law which is based on the Quran but has jurisdiction over both 
religious and secular duties and prescribes the penalties for offences against such duties.  
Jihad – with a literal translation of ‘struggle’, it is most closely associated with ‘holy war’, 
whether a believer’s internal struggle with his faith or the struggle to maintain and defend 
Muslim society and Islam. 
Quran – is the holy book revealed to the Prophet Muhammad over twenty-three years by God.  
It consists of 114 chapters and is written in Arabic.  
Saqafat-e-Islami – are compulsory courses of study at Afghan universities in introduction to 
Islamic culture and values. 
Hejab – is a veil that Muslim women use to cover their heads as a sign of modesty, privacy, and 
morality and in abeyance of Islamic law. 
Takfir – is an Arabic word which refers to the practice of excommunication wherein one 
Muslim declares that another Muslim has abandoned Islam and is no more a part of Muslim 







This study aims to examine the trends in student radicalization across eight university campuses 
in Afghanistan.  We conclude from our survey of student and staff views and an analysis of the 
character of protests across campuses that the extent of student radicalization varies.  In 
particular, we come to three noteworthy findings.  First, most university students are more 
concerned over prospects of post-graduation follow-on careers than ideological ambition. 
Second, while we find that most students and lecturers denounce radical views and violence, a 
relatively more aggressive response to both the policies of the Afghan government and the armed 
international intervention exhibited by students from universities in Kabul, Qandahar and 
Nangarhar suggests differentiated patterns across university campuses, with these campuses 
suggestive of a stronger tendency toward radicalized views.  Finally, as an institution, the 
university does not play a strong role in the radicalization of its students. Rather, a charged 
political climate and the readily available opportunity to mobilize quickly enable students to 
stand in protest rather easily.  However, findings also suggest that it is this same easy access to 
mobilize in protest that seems to attract a number of external groups as evident by the black, 
white and green flags representative of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the militant wing of Hezb-e-
Islami Hekmatyar.  Moreover, it is these protests that seem to encourage polarization and 
consequential division on campus which increasingly resemble the practice of takfir.  Referring 
to the practice of excommunication wherein one Muslim declares that another Muslim has 
abandoned Islam, takfir is in direct competition with the more tolerant teachings common to the 
characteristically liberal curriculum of public universities.  While protest in and of itself is a 
characteristic common to progressive democracies, evidence suggests that some student protests 
do call for division along sectarian lines or the suppression of women’s rights, both of which 
stand in contradiction to democratic principles and pose a threat to stability.  With more than 
sixty-three percent of the Afghan population under the age of twenty-four, left unchecked such 
influence has the likelihood and potential to expand with substantial consequences for 
development and security in Afghanistan.  As Afghanistan moves into a new phase of its era of 
state-building, a special focus on meeting the needs of its youth and in particular of Afghan 
university students is indispensable in meeting and maintaining lasting stability and prosperity.   
 
This study is the first part of an ongoing series of papers dedicated to examining the trends in 
radicalization across the various sectors throughout Afghanistan.  Launched in late 2013, we plan 
follow-on studies to complement the series, including examinations of the trends in 








1. As an institution, the university does not play a strong role in the radicalization of its 
students.  Rather, a charged political climate and the readily available opportunity to 
mobilize quickly enable students to stand in protest rather easily.  However, such 
accessibility seems to be attracting a number of external groups as evident by the black, 
white, and green flags representative of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the militant wing of 
Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar. 
 
2. While the character of student response at most universities suggests moderate views, 
those from Kabul, Qandahar and Nangarhar indicated a relatively stronger sense of  
radical tone.  Whereas much else remains relatively similar across the universities 
studied, these campuses stand out as the ones where the black, white, and green flags 
representative of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the militant wing of Hezb-e-Islami 
Hekmatyar are present, suggesting that such external groups are the source of potential 
radicalization rather than the university. 
 
3. Aside from Bamian University, most lecturers do not keep with the Ministry of Higher 
Education’s recommended syllabus and develop religious studies curriculum syllabus in 
line with their own ideological interpretations and expectations.  As a consequence, the 
likelihood of such curriculum to stray from moderate to more extreme tone increases. 
 
4. The majority of students and lecturers reject the idea that violence is a means of protest 
justified by Islam with most student protest characterized by rhetoric against ongoing 
violence and civilian casualties, and not by religious or cultural difference. 
 
5. Students largely are more concerned about their post-graduation follow-on careers than 
ideological ambitions as evidenced by their call for better on campus programs and post-






1. As a means of limiting and insulating university students from the infiltration of external 
influences, we recommend a civil society coalition or watchdog organization to monitor 
higher education practices, standards, and quality of instruction.  They should especially 
watch for external interference in the development of curriculum and the implementation 
of practices and standards that may promote radical ideology. 
 
2. As a means of countering potentially precarious differences in curriculum and practices 
across university campuses, the Ministry of Higher Education should institutionalize a 
national standard across all university campuses and for all faculties.  Additionally, the 
Ministry should provide continuing education for staff and lecturers aimed at promoting 
and maintaining such national standards. 
 
3. As post-graduation employment is a primary concern of students, the Ministry of Higher 
Education should institutionalize job placement, internship, and fellowship programs for 
students and prospective graduates based on merit with particular emphasis on 
eliminating the favoritism and nepotism that drives students toward radicalized protests. 
 
4. As a means of encouraging greater intergroup participation and a move beyond common 
ethnic and sectarian divisions, the Ministry of Higher Education should provide funding 
for and diversify student associations to complement the predominantly religious-based 







Popular protest in Afghanistan has its roots in the late 1970s and 1980s when religious groups 
stood against the competing socialist ideology that culminated in the Soviet invasion.  Declaring 
jihad, many turned to radical interpretations of Islam as a means of resistance.  Again following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent civil war that overwhelmed Afghanistan, the 
Taliban would turn to radical interpretations of Islam as a means of gaining control and 
governance over the country.  Although in both cases extreme measures were applied, the appeal 
to the notion of defeating the atheist invaders and calming the violence of civil war attracted 
favor to the jihadist and Taliban ideology by some of the people.  With the fall of the Taliban 
regime in 2001, a number of factors including the continued US presence in Afghanistan, 
corruption within the government, and unequal distribution of economic benefits have again 
provoked some of the population to organize in protest.  
A number of incidents on university campuses across Afghanistan over the last five years raise 
concerns over the potential radicalization of students and the role universities may play in 
encouraging them.  In 2009, more than three thousand students from Nangarhar University stood 
in protest against US operations in the area.  Blocking the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway, students 
burned the US flag while others carried and placed the remains of civilian casualties in front of 
the governor’s house (Kakar, 2009).  Again in 2011, university students engaged in protest; this 
time against the Loya Jirga’s decision to support a strategic partnership with the United States 
(Xinhua, 2011).  In another incident, a student was killed during sectarian motivated violent 
protest at Kabul University when Shia students attempted to use the dormitory mosque to 
celebrate Ashura
1
 and were confronted by Sunni students (Ahmed, 2012).  In 2012, up to five 
thousand students and faculty of Kabul University protested against an anti-Islam film
2
 produced 
abroad.  Then again, in May 2013, students from Kabul University protested in response to 
legislation criminalizing violence against women (Hodge & Totakhil, 2013).  Especially 
troubling is the presence of the black, white (Osman, 2012), and green flags representative of al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, and the militant wing of Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar that are flown by small 
pockets of student protesters at a number of these gatherings.  Reportedly, protests are 
increasingly organized by such fringe political parties and radical activists (Coll, 2012). 
  
                                                          
1 The celebration of Ashura is observed by Shia and is the commemoration of the martyrdom of the Prophet 
Mohammad’s grandson Husayn ibn Ali who stood in protest against Yazid Sufyan’s claim to the Caliphate.  
Disagreement by followers of Islam as to who should have been the rightful Caliphate resulted in the division 
founded the Shia and Sunni sect of Islam.   
 
2 The film Innocence of Muslims is a 13-minute low-budget movie posted on YouTube by Egyptian-American 
Nakoula Basseley Nakoula in 2012 which was met with protest in Australia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and a 





This study aims to 1) examine the trends in student radicalization on university campuses in 
Afghanistan; 2) compare the character of student protests across university campuses; and 3) 





University life is expected to provide students the opportunity to develop the critical thinking 
skills necessary to intelligently speak their minds.  It is a place where students become exposed 
to varying interpretations of reality as advanced by lecturers and debated among peers.  It is 
where students develop their opinions and find a forum readily available to debate such opinions.  
However, although student debate remains a valued component of university life which is largely 
met with approval, history has shown how such peaceful discussions can swiftly transform into 
activism before intensifying into radicalism (White, 1989; Seferiades & Johnston, 2012; Frey & 
Morris, 1991).  Such was the case for Afghanistan where many of the Afghan mujahedeen who 
fought the Soviets had their beginnings as student activists in the 1970s, including infamous 
figures such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hodge & Totakhil, 2013).  It was also on these very same 
campuses that the competing ideology of communism took hold of another group of students.  
The actions and discourse of both groups reinforced the polarity that came to define and 
differentiate them (Emadi, 2001; Kakar, 1995).  The rhetoric not only characterized communists 
as infidels, in a similar tone it identified any supposed Muslims who agreed with any of its tenets 
as kafirs, or unbelievers.  As a result divisions also grew from within the ranks of Muslims 
(Huldt & Jansson, 1988; Rubin, 2002), suggestive of extremist sentiments characteristic of 
radicalism.  For this study, we first draw the distinction between academic debate, activism, and 
radicalism.  Second, we develop the concept of radicalization through a survey of existing 
literature.  Finally, we explain the concept of takfir as a tool for operationalizing the concept of 
radicalization. 
A common practice across university campuses, debate is a means of empowering students to 
use the capacity of language to negotiate and shape impressions of the world (Mitchell, 1998).  It 
is credited with building confidence, public speaking skills, and leadership qualities.  Some argue 
that it is a founding principle and core obligation of universities to develop critical minds capable 
of engaging in debate (Freeley, 2013; Lapakko, 2009).  However, historically the hierarchical 
system and pedagogical methods that existed within the classrooms of Afghanistan provided 
teachers with unchallenged authority that often suppressed the exercise of such freedom of 
speech.   
Activism on the other hand, situated between academic debate and radicalism, is characterized 
by scholars as a social movement (Sampson, 1967; Weiss, Aspinall, & Thompson, 2012).  
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Unlike the individualism of debate, activism draws on a collective of shared opinions while 
organizing and framing support in symbolism, discourse, and practice (Wiktorowicz, 2004) such 
as the flags, billboards and rhetoric evident at some gatherings.  Its strength, resting on the 
reciprocal acknowledgement of fellow activists, encourages both new and long time members to 
‘buy into’ and remain committed to the system (Azzi, Chryssochooc, Klandermans, Simon, & 
Stekelenburg, 2011).  As a result, the perseverance of movements rests on an inner cohesion of 
its members.  It was such conditions that helped to inspire and motivate student activism in the 
United States during the 1960s (Altbach & Cohen, 1990) when University of California students 
protesting for their freedom of speech, staged a sit-in around a police car attempting to transport 
a fellow activist to prison.  Similarly, it was with such sense of community that the pro-
democracy protest in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square occurred in 1989 despite the risk of violent 
opposition against protestors (Davis & Vogel, 1990).  One of the earliest signs of campus 
activism in Afghanistan traces back to the 1960s when increasing numbers of university 
graduates shared a common frustration over the difficulty in finding employment commensurate 
to their education level (Gritzner & Shroder, 2007).  Frustration over the under utilization of 
their skills, and overall anger at the nepotism practiced by the ruling elite, fueled retaliation in 
the form of public disobedience that consequently led to the crisis and regime change in 1973 
(Giustozzi, 2010).  History suggests that it was within this context that Afghan Islamic political 
parties, and more importantly their radical wings, took the opportunity to become more visible.  
The Soviet invasion that followed only served to further embolden and radicalize these 
movements, often with the encouragement and support of members the international community 
(Goodson, 2001; Arnold, 1985; Amstutz, 1986). 
Since the events of 9/11, the concept of radicalization has increasingly become elusive
3
.  
Shrouded in prejudices and preconceptions, interpretations of the concept now lie somewhere 
between stereotyping and broad assumptions.  Being Muslim increasingly has become associated 
with being radical (Azzi et al., 2011).  Consistency in defining radicalization became 
questionable, leading some to believe that we should “abandon the attempt to use ‘radicalization’ 
as an absolute concept” (Sedgwick, 2010).  Agreeing with this recommendation, we aim to 
investigate the relative nature of radicalization across university campuses, and not under 
absolute terms.  Broadly defined, radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual or 
group increasingly relies on violent or near violent means to achieve political, religious, or social 
ideals and goals (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).  However, some argue that violence is not a 
necessary attribute of radicalization, while others argue that the techniques employed by such 
groups are violent by their very nature (Ashour, 2009).  According to (Springer, Regens & 
Edger, 2009), radicalization can begin either as a grassroots bottom-up approach wherein 
individualized sentiments manifest into radicalized views and approaches, or a top-down 
                                                          
3 As depicted in the chart, media use of the term remained relatively flat until the mid 2000s when there was 
a proliferation of news reports covering events around 9/11 and the search for Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda 
operatives.  News reports between 2005 and 2007 are characterized by a significant increase and more 




dynamic influence where radical groups recruit and indoctrinate candidates.  In both cases, 
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007) argue this transition occurs over four phases including pre-radicalization, 
self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization, while Azzi et al. (2011) theorize a staircase 
metaphor to explain the successive psychological transformation and consequential 
radicalization of individuals and groups.  It is exactly such measurable stages of radicalization 
that could provide early indications of the direction and progress of student protests.   
 
Violent extremism is an exemplary form of radicalism whereby individuals stray further off the 
path of activism and employ terrorism as a tool to achieving their ideals and goals.  Radicalized 
violent extremism “refers to the processes by which people come to adopt beliefs that not only 
justify violence but compel it” (Moussalli, 2009).  Moreover, according to Wiktorowicz (2005) 
there has been an “erosion of critical constraints used to limit warfare and violence in classical 
Islam” (2).  Recalling the contributions of religious scholars such as Sayyid Qutb, Mawlana Abul 
A’la Mawdudi, Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Nuhaas al-Demyati, and Muhammad bin Abdul 
Wahhab, he argues that such erosion of the mechanisms of constraints allows for a wider 
definition of apostasy which consequentially divides society and subjects a larger population to 
violence.  Historically Islamic scholars defined apostates as those who leave the faith and declare 
themselves non-Muslims or those who reject the key tenets of Islam.  However, modern day 
radicals often argue that anyone who does not conform to their individualized and particular 
interpretation of Islam is an apostate.  Moreover, they call for and believe it to be a divine duty to 
wage jihad against anyone who fails to surrender to their interpretation.  Take for example the 
generally accepted Islamic principle that civilians should not be targeted in war.  According to 
the radical beliefs of al-Qaeda, all civilians living in a Western democracy are subject to attack in 
accordance with its doctrine of proportional response, which requires an equivalent of Western 
casualties to that of Muslim casualties of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (SRS Report for 
Congress, 2007, p 6).  However, violent extremism is not “synonymous with Islamic 
radicalism…religious belief is only one example of legitimizing ideology that can contribute to 
violent activity” (Southers, 2013).  As a result, grievances over political and social conditions 
including corruption and personal freedoms could trigger violent extremism as well.  For this 
reason, while ideological radicalization may lead to violence and terrorism, we must accept that 
violence may occur in the absence of religious radicalization. 
 
This study understands radicalization as an extreme form of protest which is socially constructed 
and reinforced by student experience with nepotism, ethnic and sectarian discrimination, and 
differentiated political opinion.  According to this interpretation, radicalization remains in a near 
continuous state, with each event reconditioning and reinforcing student behavior with each 
passing year, from freshman to job-seeking graduate.  As a consequence, one would expect to 
find increasing levels of radicalization over time as the pressures of competition increases.  
However, while differences in belief and practices in and of themselves do not constitute 
radicalization, it is the use of such differences as devices for segregation, alienation, and 
potential violence that qualifies as radicalization.  The practice of takfir, wherein one Muslim 
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declares that another Muslim has abandoned Islam, falls sharply on the extreme end of the 
spectrum as it calls for violent differentiation and division.  It is this concept which we use to 
organize and measure our indicators of radicalization against. 
The Kharijites, a movement dating back to the caliphate of Uthman, is said to have advanced the 
practice of takfir in response to the alleged unjust policies of the third caliph, including nepotism 
and the unequal distribution of wealth (Timani, 2008).  In response, the Kharijites developed a 
most “rigid and narrow hermeneutic” and encouraged a “wholesale declaration of takfir against 
diligently observant Muslims who violated even minor aspects” of their interpretation of Islam 
(Hussain, 2002, p. 2).  More importantly, seeking refuge from political manipulation they turned 
to an “artificial purity through hermeneutics that revolved around an uncompromising doctrine of 
takfir” which permitted them unchallenged authority to eliminate whomever they considered 
insufficiently pure (Hussain, 2002).  This was not the only case of employing takfir as a political 
tool.  According to (Abu Khalil, 1994), takfir was used as a weapon employed to discredit 
political opponents while (Moussalli, 2009) argues that the Saudi royal family called on takfir as 
a means of purification of the population and justification for enforcing the people’s loyalties to 
the King’s absolute power.  Within the Kharijite movement, the Azariqah, an Islamic sub-sect in 
the city of Basra called upon similar processes when they labeled all other Muslims unbelievers 
to justify the killings that followed (Fishbein, 1992).  More recently and as a means of permitting 
jihad against both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, some groups call upon takfir as a means for 
qualifying their jihad against individuals or groups they understand as non-believers.  For 
example, the 1960s Egyptian radical Islamist movement Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra, aiming to rid the 
world of ‘heretics,’ considered much of the Muslim world outside their strict Salafi interpretation 
of Islam as unbelievers under takfir.  Relative to the moderate Islam practiced by vast numbers 
of Muslims, Wahabism promotes the practice of takfir as a guiding principle and as a result is 
considered a radical form of Islam by some (Moussalli, 2009).  Ironically ordained as a reform 
movement, Wahabism aimed to return to traditional Islamic values with bans on visiting shrines, 
the drawing and photographing of humans, and listening to certain types of music, and strict 
adherence to Islamic over secular jurisprudence.  The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the 





METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
 
For this study, 400 students
4
 were randomly selected by systematic sampling from across eight 
university campuses throughout Afghanistan.  Additionally, focus groups comprised of 15 
students each were held on the selected campuses.  As this was a random selection, we assume 
that participants are representative of the ethnic and sectarian make up of the larger provincial 
community.  Moreover, as ethnicity plays a key organizing role in Afghan society, effort was 
made in finding a diverse selection for the sample.  For example, while Kabul University is 
represented by a fairly ethnically diverse student body, Nangarhar and Qandahar are 
overwhelmingly Pashtun.  In order to offset this imbalance, Herat and Badakhshan were selected 
because of their majority Tajik makeup.  In addition to the student body, two professors of 
general studies, two faculty members of Islamic theology, and one preacher from university 
mosques were selected from each campus with the exception of Qandahar where the faculty 
refused to participate.  Secondary source data was collected through a set of interviews with 
university hostel managers, student union representatives, social scientists, and political analysts.   
 
In addition to basic statistical analysis of our findings, the core of our analysis is qualitative in 
nature.  Examining the statements of interviewees, we determine if and to what extent they 
experience or advance an‘us versus them’ attitude characteristic of the practice of takfir and 
suggestive of divisive radical ideology.  In particular, questions about domestic politics, campus 
life and values, and expectations for the future were designed to measure responses on a scale 
ranging from tolerant to hostile.  Evidence suggesting tolerance indicated less likelihood of 
radicalization while indications otherwise suggested the practice of takfir and the potential for 
radicalization.  All answers were codified to discover and check patterns against the study’s main 
themes. We also used concept mapping methodology during qualitative analysis of the data. 
 
The field research team comprised of ten degree holders in the social and behavioral sciences, 
including journalism, political science, and conflict studies.  Each participated in a three-day 
group training which included an introduction to the study, field research methodology, and 
techniques for interviewing and administering focus groups.  Special emphasis was placed on 
performing a rigorously uniformed study, which included regular interval quality assurance 
checks of infield practice and post interview transcriptions. 
 
The field research team did meet with some obstacles and limitations.  Although field 
researchers followed strict ethical guidelines
5
 and presented the appropriate disclosures, 
including those outlining the confidentiality of identity and testimony, some interviewees were 
not convinced and remained unaccommodating.  Field researchers faced resistance or even 
outright denial of access in some cases as a result of candidate interviewees’ sensitivity to the 
                                                          
4 50 students were selected from each university campus. 
5 Training and approach to fieldwork adhered to standards outlined in the Economic and Social Research 
Council Ethics (ESRC) Guidelines (See http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx). 
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nature of the topic.  Some candidate interviewees, attempting to stay within the margins of what 
they consider the socially acceptable, avoided controversial answers and only conveyed 
politically correct comments.  Similarly, some teachers also refrained from participation for fear 
of reprisal from the university administration for any critical comments they make.  In one 
instance, the Chancellor of Badakhshan University threatened to call on the National Directorate 
of Security (NDS) if field researchers did not leave the campus.  Security also remained a 
concern and major obstacle, especially when traveling to Qandahar and Nangarhar.   
 
In addition to finding themselves in conflict conditions, field researchers also had difficulty 
maintaining contact with interviewees on a number of occasions when security conditions 
worsened, forcing interviewees to cancel their meetings.  Finally, there were a limited number of 
female participants as a consequence of the problems described above, in particular at 
universities in Qandahar and Nangarhar.  As a result, findings are disproportionately reflective of 
the opinions of the male population. While we expect that the sample size and corroboration of 
evidence with those who did participate is sufficient to normalize responses and provide a good 
approximation of opinions, we also acknowledge the limits of our findings.  However, similar 




There are three noteworthy findings from our study.  First, most university students are 
concerned over prospects of post-graduation follow-on careers rather than ideological ambition.  
It is these same students that favor internationally accepted democratic values and human rights.  
Nonetheless, it is also these same students that protest for a reduction of US operations in 
Afghanistan and the consequential civilian casualties.  Second, while we find that most students 
and lecturers denounce radical views and violence, a relatively more aggressive response to both 
the policies of the Afghan government and the armed international intervention exhibited by 
students and staff from universities in Kabul, Qandahar and Nangarhar suggests differentiated 
patterns across university campuses, with these campuses reflecting of a stronger tendency 
toward radicalization.  Finally as an institution, the university does not play a strong role in the 
radicalization of its students, rather external groups take advantage of student mobilization as a 





The Characteristics of Student Protest across Afghanistan  
 
In Afghanistan, most university students are concerned over prospects of post-graduation follow-
on careers rather than ideological ambition.  Similar to the historically secular characteristic of 
student protests over political and economic concerns (Shafiq, Mason, Seybolt, & DeLuca, 2014 
; Wasserstrom, 1991), antiwar sentiments (McCormick, 2000; Garfinkle, 1995; Cookson, 1982), 
and rights and freedoms (Mason, 2000; Wright, 2001), student protests in Afghanistan have been 
largely characterized by calls for action against discrimination on campus and for better student 
services (Sultani, 2013), protest against civilian casualties caused by the ongoing insurgency 
operations led by US forces (Walizada, 2009), and the eradication of corruption and nepotism 
(Wadsam, 2013).  Although students may call on religion to support their arguments during 
protests, the character and motives behind some protests suggest they place similar emphasis on 
secular instruments. 
 
Figure 2: Degree of Acceptance of the Norms of Human Rights and Democracy 
 
 
Figure 2 reflects the degree of acceptance of internationally accepted norms of human rights and democracy as 
measured on a three tier scale from 1) fully applicable to Afghanistan, 2) applicable as a complement to Sharia, and 
3) not applicable to Afghanistan as determined by interviewee answers to the question, “are internationally accepted 
norms of human rights and democracy applicable to Afghanistan?”   
 
Of those interviewed, approximately 75% of students favor democratic values and norms, while 
the remaining twenty-five percent largely from Kabul, Qandahar, Nangarhar and Qunduz find 
that a political system more deeply rooted in Islam is necessary.  Favoring the application of 
such internationally accepted norms, students from Bamian University claim that although “we 
may accept human rights and democracy…and appreciate that decisions are left for the people to 
make under such governance…the problem begins with how it is interpreted throughout 
Afghanistan.”  Those that disagreed with the applicability of such norms, such as students from 
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sexual freedom of women” to perverse ends.  Another student from Jalalabad University claimed 
that the consequences of such freedoms indicate how Democracy is “a culture of infidels.”  
Those students positioned somewhere in the middle, such as one student from Bamian University 
who argues for international norms as a complement for Sharia, emphasize that although he 
“respects Democracy and human rights, his respect is limited to the point at which it becomes 
evident that accepting such norms become harmful to our tradition or religious values.”   
 
Although students from Kabul, Qandahar, Nangarhar and Qunduz exhibit a stronger sense of 
opposition toward the increased institutionalization of democratic norms and practices, they 
remain diagnostic as they weigh the pros and cons.  Similarly, students who argued in favor for 
such democratic norms and practices also remained critical.   
 
Figure 3: Reasons for Afghan Resentment against the US and the West 
 
 
Figure 3 reflects the difference of opinions across university campuses about the reason for resentment against the 
US and the West, where resentment exists.  Answers to the question, “what is the main reason for Afghan resentment 
against the US and the West?” are organized as 1) general ignorance by the populace about the role of the US and 
West in Afghanistan, 2) US foreign policy, and 3) Religious differences between Afghanistan and the US and the West.   
Of those students that believe the main reason for resentment against the US and the West is 
chiefly an argument against its foreign policy, many point to the rise of the Taliban as a 
consequence of US foreign policy in the 1980s.  Students from Bamian University claim that it 
was one of the US’s “dirtiest foreign policy” and that the US does not necessarily prioritize the 
building of unity among the Afghan people.  Some students at Herat University went as far as to 
claim that “like the Soviet Union, the US wants to occupy Afghanistan…and benefit from its 
natural resources.”   
 
In Qandahar where nearly 30% of students protest against military search operations of local 
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country.  These same students believe that self-interests and an aim to destroy the social fabric of 
Afghan society remains the reason behind the prolonged US presence in Afghanistan.  They 
point to civilian casualties and claim that such senseless deaths are the main reason for their 
anger and resentment.  Similarly sentiments were felt at Jalalabad University where students 
largely agreed that the deaths of innocent civilians contribute largely to their resentment. 
 
On the other hand, more than 70% of the students from Bamian University are optimistic about 
the continued US presence in Afghanistan and believe that it is crucial for maintaining a lasting 
peace and stability.  They largely believe that general ignorance among the people and their 
tendency to trust the rhetoric of neighboring states, especially Iran and Pakistan, manipulate their 
opinion and position against a continued US presence in Afghanistan.  They further argue that in 
spite of US attempts to develop a united Afghanistan, the population continues to be fragmented 
and polarized because of such ignorance and trust in the rhetoric of neighboring states.   
 
Of those students that believe religious differences account for the resentment against the US and 
the West, many view the diffusion of Western culture and norms as a threat to the historical 
culture and religion of Afghanistan.  According to one student from Balkh University, “Western 
countries want to weaken our religious values and traditions, hence our resentment,” while 
another student from Herat University points to the Quran and argues that according to the script, 
Jews and Christians will “never become your friend and to not expect friendship from them.”  At 
Qandahar University, students sum up their resentment arguing that the West neither understand 





Figure 4: Change in Tolerance toward other Ethnic and Sectarian Groups  
 
 
Figure 4 reflects student opinions of how their perception of other ethnic and sectarian groups has changed since 
they entered university.  Student answers to the question “has university life encouraged an increase, decrease or no 
change in your tolerance toward other ethnic and sectarian groups?” are organized as they have experienced 1) an 
increase, 2) a decrease, or 3) no change in their perception of other ethnic and sectarian groups since entering 
university. 
When asked about life on campus, most students believe that the diversity found on campus has 
allowed them to move beyond previously held beliefs and discrimination against other groups.  
They find a new tolerance encouraged by their bonds as academic peers.  Students at Kabul 
University claim that mixed dormitories, where up to six students from various ethnic and 
sectarian backgrounds live together, has been a positive learning experience.  A student from 
Bamian University claims that negative views gained throughout his childhood were shattered 
now that he is on campus and interact daily with students of other ethnicities and sects.  
However, such sentiments are contradicted in environments where students feel threatened by 
favoritism toward particular groups, such as in Kabul where such feelings exploded in violence.  
Students from Kabul argue that when such “fighting and conflict among students from different 
sects arise, my opinion changes…violence between Hazaras and Sunnis in the dormitory has 
changed the opinions of many students.”  Most students agree that corruption, especially in the 
form of nepotism, fosters a climate of discrimination that results in such unfair treatment that 
subsequently calls them to protest.  Of those students that claim no change in their feeling toward 
other ethnic or sectarian groups, they largely come from diverse backgrounds where such diverse 
conditions already existed.  
 
As post-graduation follow-on careers remain a primary concern among students, the rhetoric that 
underscores their protest largely reflects such aspirations.  For example, in calling for better 
student services and the eradication of corruption, especially those associated with nepotism, 

















overwhelming support of democratic values and opinions in favor of the US presence in 
Afghanistan rest on student confidence that such conditions will increase the likelihood of post-
graduation opportunities.   
 
Examining the responses of students and the history of protests across university campuses, it 
becomes evident that factors other than the university account for the differences in student 
radicalization.  Kabul, Nangarhar, and Qandahar have experienced much greater levels of 
violence compared to Herat, Bamian, Qunduz, Jawzjan and Balkh.  As a result, one would expect 
a stronger sense of opposition and protest against the continued US presence in Afghanistan and 
the policies of the Afghan government.  However other protests, such as those that stand in 
opposition to the institution of the women’s right decree, are also very strong in these same areas 
suggesting that the area maintains relatively strong conservative and potentially radical beliefs.  
In combination these two facts suggest that the violence to preserve such values and more 
importantly the mobilizing of students to violence as a means of preserving such values has its 
origins off campus.  More specifically when tracing student motivation, in the cases where the 
university fails to meet the expectations of students there is a tendency for them to look for 
support elsewhere.  This phenomenon is particularly striking when student interests match the 
interests of external groups’ protests, consequently developing into a convenient alliance of 
interests.  Arguably, it is such relations of convenience that draws the characteristically moderate 
tone of student protest to new heights of aggression and radical rhetoric.   
 
The Extent of Institutionalized Radicalization on University Campuses 
 
The university as an institution does not play a strong role in encouraging student radicalization.  
Rather, this study finds that lecturers at most universities attempt to find a balance between 
religious obligations and the secular nature of general studies while also continuing to encourage 
gender, ethnic, and religious diversity in all aspects of campus life.  Moreover, these same 
lecturers also increasingly look toward further diversification and innovation through academic 
exchange and visiting researcher opportunity.  However, this does not hold true on all campuses. 
 
When asked if the armed opposition by the Taliban against the Afghan government is justified 
according to Islam, lecturers from Kabul, Qandahar and Nangarhar argued that Muslims should 
exhaust every means possible to defend Islam and confront corruption, including taking up arms.  
Lecturers from Bamian, Herat, Qunduz, Jawzjan, and Balkh were largely against violent 
opposition, arguing for mediation and peaceful settlement.  These same faculties believe Islam 
promotes peaceful coexistence and peaceful means to conflict resolution.  However there was 
concern in Jawzjan where lecturers believed that influence from non-Islamic states increasingly 
threatens the development of traditional religious studies.  Those in Bamian and Herat respond to 
such concerns by arguing for the adoption of institutionalized exchange programs between 
universities and local Madrasass.  Even so, a small number of lecturers from Qunduz, Jawzjan 
and Balkh believed that armed opposition to government corruption was necessary.    
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Figure 5 reflects the opinions of interviewees on whether the “armed opposition by the Taliban against the Afghan 
government is justified according to Islam?” 
 
The sentiments of students largely mirrored those of staff.  In Jalalabad students largely agree 
with the Taliban’s strategy and objectives, however they disapprove of indiscriminate violence 
where there are civilian casualties and roads and homes destroyed.  In Kabul, students who 
agreed with the Taliban strategy call for greater emphasis on religion in the government and 
claim that Taliban will bring greater legitimacy to governance in Afghanistan.  On the other 
hand, students from Bamian, Herat, Qunduz, Jawzjan and Balkh University disagree with the 
Taliban and its strategy arguing that such violence is un-Islamic. 
 
When asked about their views on the political climate in Afghanistan, most lecturers agreed that 
democracy alone cannot govern Afghanistan; rather a system that incorporates principles of the 
Quran is vital to both gain the trust of the people and to enforce moral codes of justice.  
However, these same lecturers remain critical of the democracy practiced by the central 
government and find that it is corrupt and hypocritical.     
On women’s rights, most lecturers believe that women are an integral part of Afghan society and 
have the right to work, in government or otherwise, as long as they abide by the rules and 
regulations of Islam in the conduct of their work.  However, lecturers from Kabul, Nangarhar, 
and Bamian University believe that women should not work and should remain outside the 
public eye.  However, Bamian University remains the only campus that follows the religious 
studies curriculum syllabus prepared by the Ministry of Higher Education; an indication that 
class room lectures and the personal opinions of lecturers remain separate.  However, although 




























not unique to Afghanistan nor is it particular to Islamic nations, without oversight in place 
radical opinions and content may disseminate across lecture halls unchecked. 
 
Students from Herat University pointed out that where you have Sunni professors and Shia 
students you are bound to have tension and conflict while students from Kabul University argue 
that religious lecturers try to avoid such student on student tension through censorship, 
permitting only their voices to be heard.  According to a number of students from Kabul 
University, under such conditions lecturers carry on unchallenged with their verbal abuse as they 
ignore your questions, ridicule your point of view, and discourage any sense of critical analysis 
of religious studies.  At Bamian University, some students preferring not to argue with lecturers 
remain silent.  At Kabul University, where students claim that the Sunni-dominant departments 
disproportionately favor Sunnis over Shiite, sectarian violence has manifested on a number of 
occasions. 
 
When examining and comparing the extent of student radicalization on and across university 
campuses as a consequence of influences from within the university system we find that although 
the conservative nature of lecturers from Kabul, Qandahar, and Nangarhar in and of itself is not 
seen as strongly influential in the radicalization of students, their call for taking up arms in the 
defense of Islam is.  It is obviously a difficult task to change the long held position and opinions 
of these senior lecturers, however allowing these same lecturers to continue developing course 
syllabus outside of the Ministry of Higher Education’s guidelines runs the risk of diffusing their 
potentially radical ideology across campus.  In Bamian, although we find similarly conservative 
views, lecturers pose relatively less threat of diffusing their ideology as they adhere to the 
Ministry of Higher Education’s syllabus guidelines.  Particularly sensitive is the sectarian 
difference that exists throughout most classrooms and the approach lecturers take toward dealing 
with such difference.  Maintaining a ‘strictly by the book’ lecture format may help to reduce the 
potential for the university as an institution to influence the radicalization of its students.    
 
The Extent of External Influences on the Radicalization of Students 
 
Findings suggest that external parties take advantage of their access to universities and co-opt the 
mobilizing power of student protests as a means for advancing their interests.  In particular these 
groups develop patron-client relations with students through the support and funding of student 
association and the promise of post-graduation prospects.  In return students become their 
mouthpieces in protest.  Often, these relations instigate division along ethnic or sectarian lines, 
which encourages aggression among students.  Moreover, the campuses that exhibit a greater 
sense of radicalized protests reside in close proximity to historically highly politicized regions 
where political parties, warlords, and Madrasas govern in a relatively conservative manner.   One 
such case was recorded in Jalalabad where the Dar-ul-Olume Madrasa reportedly was 
responsible for the mobilization of student protest against the US presence in Afghanistan (VOA, 
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2013).  Another was reported in Kabul, where Jamiat-e-Islah mobilized student protest against 




 and direct means, Jamiat-e-Islah reportedly encouraged more than 
three hundred students to stand in protest against the proposed legislation.  Considered a charity 
organization (Habibi, 2013) and a social reform movement (Hashmi, 2012) that closely 
resembles the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (Larson, 2009), Jamiat-e-Islah argues for a 
stronger Islamic government.  Although it has its origins in the 1980s, it only recently officially 
registered in 2003 with the Ministry of Justice.  Although it has a presence throughout 
Afghanistan, Jamiat-e-Islah has significant membership in Kabul and Nangarhar.  Reportedly, 
membership is a long and arduous process and includes weekly classes under the supervision of 
other members for years.  Nevertheless, anyone can participate in their protest activities.  Such 
was the case in 2013 when they protested against the ouster of Egyptian President Muhammad 
Morsi (Osman, 2013) at Kabul University and in a number of other areas.  Some of their key 
divisive arguments include a call for the elimination of women from the public sphere and their 
return to traditional roles, and the rejection of what are seen as Western-inspired human rights 
and values in favor of traditional Islamic values rooted in Salafism.   
 
In addition to recruiting students, reportedly these groups seek out a more permanent presence on 
campus.  In recent years a number of student associations have been established across university 
campuses in Afghanistan. Lecturers in Balkh University view the establishment of religious 
associations and otherwise as a democratic right and a positive step toward increased freedom of 
expression on campus.  However, they also fear the potential for the dissemination of radical 
views by the external parties who establish and/or fund these student associations.  As the 
Ministry of Higher Education does not provide financial support for student associations, 
universities are forced to look elsewhere.  As a consequence, external parties dictate the lines 
along which student associations are established.  In Herat and Kabul, lecturers claim that 
student associations are established along ethnic lines, while in Jawzjan, reportedly student 
associations are backed by warlords.  As many of these groups act as gatekeepers to post-
graduation opportunities, students are forced to develop patron-client relations as a means of 




                                                          
6 Groups such as Jamiat-e-Islah employ a number of tools for recruiting and transmitting their propaganda 
such as social media, workshops and seminars, and direct means.  The use of social media and the Internet as 
a means of mobilization has grown exponentially over the last decade.   For example, in the first six months of 





This study aimed to examine the trends in student radicalization across eight university campuses 
in Afghanistan.  We conclude that student radicalization is more evident on campuses located in 
Kabul, Qandahar, and Nangarhar, however the university as an institution does not play a strong 
role in the radicalization of its students.  Rather, a charged political climate and the readily 
available opportunity to mobilize quickly enable students to stand in protest rather easily.  
However, findings also suggest that it is this same easy access to mobilize in protest that seems 
to attract a number of external groups as evident by the black, white and green flags 
representative of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the militant wing of Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar.  
Moreover, it is these protests that seem to encourage polarization and consequential division on 
campus which increasingly resemble the practice of takfir.  Left unchecked, the division it 
encourages may spread beyond university campuses and to the larger society as post-graduation 
unemployment is on the rise leaving students with time on their hands to take to the streets in 
protest. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
According to (USAID, 2014), the United States alone has spent over $19 billion in development 
assistance, including in the education sector, since 2001.  In 2014, it was estimated that over 10 
million students, including more than 2.5 million girls, benefited from such aid and are now 
enrolled in school.  This is up from the 2002 estimates of 900,000 boys with almost no girls 
attending.  While such figures are encouraging and reflect positively on US and international 
intervention in Afghanistan, it is vital that such programs continue to receive the oversight 
necessary to ensure that such aid is not in vain and that progress is not reversed.  The potential 
for the manipulation of such projects is very real while the cost to ensure against such 
manipulation is minimal relative to that already spent.   
 
Although our findings suggest that the university does not play a strong role in the radicalization 
of its students, the Ministry of Education can take steps to further insulate students against the 
potential for radicalization of students in the future.  While the police option remains on the table 
as a means of countering violent protest, a soft approach may prove a better option in the long 
run, especially since many students protest against the use of force by the state and international 
forces.  Such soft approach should include civil society coalition or watchdog organization to 
monitor higher education practices, standards, and quality of instruction.  They should especially 
watch for external interference in the development of curriculum and the implementation of 
practices and standards that may promote radical ideology.  In addition to safeguarding 
investments already made in country, such actions may discourage and limit infiltration of 




Another option includes the funding and implementation of more diversified student associations 
to complement the predominantly religious-based groups that already exists.  In addition to 
providing a greater range of extracurricular activities for students, such non-religious based 
programs is expected to encourage intergroup participation that look beyond ethnic and sectarian 
differences as membership should not make such distinctions.  As a result, not only can such 
programs discourage radicalized ideology founded on ethnic and sectarian differences and 
division, they may also actively encourage greater cohesion among students and communities. 
 
As students are largely most concerned about post-graduation follow-on careers, The Ministry of 
Higher Education should institutionalize job placement, internship, and fellowship programs for 
students and prospective graduates based on merit with particular emphasis on eliminating 
favoritism and nepotism.  University programs should continue to develop their place in 
students’ lives.  Especially important is the development of student confidence in the university 
as a trusted partner, one that does not discriminate based on ethnic or sectarian differences in the 
process of supporting students throughout their studies and follow-on career. 
 
Success in limiting and insulating students against radicalization rests in instituting such 
standards across all university campuses and within all faculties.  Moreover, the Ministry of 
Education should provide continuing education for staff and lecturers aimed at promoting and 
maintaining such standards.  Failing to apply such measures inevitably faces the potential of 
degrading gains made and consequently squandering all the funds and effort already put forward.  
As the scope of this study is limited to the last decade, further studies are recommended to track 
trends and changes over time.  Follow-on studies should aim to investigate the extent to which 
external groups gain access to student mobilization and influence the development of curriculum 
and teaching practices. 








Annex 1: Questionnaire Thematic and Structure 
 
Questions are based on the following themes organized according to research target groups.    
 
The research target groups 
1. Students as the primary source 
2. Religious studies lecturers and university imams  
3. General studies and social science lecturers 
4. Student union representatives and managers of university dormitories 
Students 
1. Islamic values, religious activities on campus, and influence of religious political 
organizations 
2. Institutional factors including policy of religious education and classroom environment 
3. External factors including presence of international community, Afghan media, and 
Taliban 
4. Views on human rights, democracy, gender and sectarian concerns 
Religious studies lecturers and university imams 
1. Development and changes to curriculum and mosque discourse 
2. Trends in student interests, participation, and sentiments 
3. Political change and its influence on religious studies 
General and social science lecturers, hostel managers, and external experts 
1. Structure and change in student views on the role of religion versus secular values 
2. Sectarian makeup and dynamics of interaction at dormitory and student union 
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Annex 3: About the AISS 
The Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) was established in October 2012 in Kabul. It 
aims to create an intellectual space for addressing strategic issues pertaining to Afghanistan in 
the wider regional and international contexts. Promoting dialogue between and among different 
stakeholders is an end as well an integral means in attaining AISS objectives. All AISS’ 
activities and programs are based on the principles of professionalism, independence, 
internationalism and progressive values.  
AISS is an independent research body, officially registered with the Afghan Ministry of 
Economy as a not-for-profit research institute dedicated to providing qualitative, non-partisan 
and policy-oriented research; publication; professional training and policy advocacy with a 
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